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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FED ERATED CAPITAL
CORPORATION, dbaFEDERATED
CAPITAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellent,
Case No. 20140570-CA

vs.
ARNELLA M. ABRAHAM, individually
and dba WESTSTAR PROPERTIES, INC.,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

****
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of

~

Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)Q).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court plainly erred in granting summary judgment when it should

have found that Abraham waived its statute of limitations defense for failing to
specifically plead the applicable statute of limitations? Unpreserved issues may be raised
~

on appeal "if the appellant demonstrates that a prejudicial error should have been obvious
to the district court." Pepperwood Homeowners Ass'n. v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137,

,r

11, 351 P.3d 844. "Under plain error review, we may reverse the lower court on an issue
not properly preserved for appeal when a party can show the following: (i) [a]n error

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the [party], or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,r 16, 164 P.3d 366.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rules 9(h) (2011) and 9(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are set forth in the
Addenda. Utah Code §§ 78B-2-103 and 78B-2-309 are also set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

The Utah Supreme Court has uniformly held that the applicable statute of
limitations must be specifically pleaded as an affirmative defense or the defense is
waived.

Appellee Amelia M. Abraham, dba Weststar Properties, Inc. ("Abraham")

entered into a binding agreement with Appellant Federated Capital Corporation's
("Federated Capital") predecessor, Advanta Bank Corporation ("Advanta").

The

agreement allowed Abraham to obtain cash advances and to make credit card purchases.
When Abraham defaulted, Federated Capital filed suit in Utah within six-years of
the default.

In her Answer, Abraham generally raised a "statute of limitations"

affirmative defense, but Abraham failed to specifically plead the statute by section
number or subsection designation, as required by Rule 9(i).
Thereafter, Abraham moved for summary judgment, asserting for the first time
that Federated Capital's suit was barred by Utah's Borrowing Statute and Pennsylvania's

2
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four-year statute of limitations. The district court found that Pennsylvania's four-year
statute of limitations was applicable, and dismissed Federated Capitals' case and awarded
Abraham attorney's fees. Given the plain requirements of Rule 9(i) and clear precedent
from the Utah Supreme Court, it should have been obvious to the district court that
Abraham waived her statute of limitations affirmative defense.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

On August 9, 2011, Federated Capital filed a Complaint against Abraham for
failure to pay credit card debt. (R. 1-3). Instead of filing an Answer, Abraham filed a
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, asserting insufficient contact with
~

the State of Utah and that Utah lacked jurisdiction under its Long Arm Statute, Utah
Code§ 78B-3-205. (R. 18-27). On February 17, 2012, the district court entertained oral
arguments and denied Abraham's motion to dismiss. (R. 101).
On February 12, 2012, Abraham filed an Answer, wherein she admitted that
payments on the credit card had not been made, and raised as her fourth defense, "As an
affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that this action fails because of the statute of
limitations." (R. 102-04).
On June 18, 2013, Abraham filed a Motion for Summary Judgment - Statute of
Limitations - and for an Award of Attorney's Fees, and in her Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, asserted for the first time that Utah Code 78-2-103 1

1

Abraham cited "Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-103." No such statute number exists.
Apparently, Abraham meant Utah Code § 78B-2-103.
3
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and Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitation for breach of contract, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §
5525(a)(8), governed. (R. 135-37).
On March 7, 2014, the district court entertained argument on the motion for
summary judgment and granted the motion and awarded Abraham attorney's fees. (R.
363-64 ). The Order granting the motion for summary judgment was entered on May 12,
2014. (R. 468-72). The district court also awarded Abraham $15,320.00 in attorney's
fees. (R. 4 72, 484-85).
On June 10, 2014, Federated Capital timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the
entire judgment, rulings, and order leading to final judgment. (R. 487-88).
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

In May 1999, Abraham, a Texas resident, applied to Advanta, a Utah banking
company, to open a business card account. (R. 181, 195). The application was approved
and a card was issued to Abraham. (R. 177, 181, 252). Abraham agreed she would be
governed by the terms and conditions found in the Business Card Agreement
("Agreement"). (R. 181).
The Agreement provided terms of payment, events of default, and terms of
controlling law and jurisdiction. As to term of payment, paragraph 6 provided:
You agree to make all payments in US dollars payable through a US
Financial institution, either by check or money order payable to us at
the location and in the manner specified on your periodic billing
statement or in any other many {such as by electronic fund transfer
or wire transfer) that we agree to and provide procedures for.

****
Account payments are to be mailed to the address for payments
shown on your periodic billing statement. Payment must be received
4
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by us at that address on or before the specified time on the Payment
Due Date stated on your periodic billing statement, and must
conform to any specific requirements for making payment which
appear with or in your billing statement. Payments tendered to and
accepted by us or our agent at a location other than the address stated
on your periodic billing statement are not effective until received by
us at the address specified.

(R. 141, 179-80, 198) (emphasis added).
Paragraph 10 of the Agreement provided the events of default, which in relevant
part are:

EVENTS OF DEFAULT: You will be in default under this
Agreement if any of the following occur: (a) you do not make the
required minimum periodic payment on the Account in the manner
and by the time of day on the Payment Due Date that are specified
on your periodic billing statement; [or] (b) you fail to pay as agreed
or otherwise default on any other obligation you have with us ....
(R. 141, 198).

Paragraph 31 provided the terms governing choice of forum and choice of law:
CONTROLLING LAW AND JURISDICTION. This Agreement
shall be governed solely by and interpreted entirely in accordance
with the laws of the State of Utah, ... regardless of where you reside.
YOU CONSENT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN UTAH AND AGREE
THAT ANY LAW SUIT PERTAINING TO THE ACCOUNT
MUST BE BROUGHT ONLY IN SUCH COURTS IN UTAH
REGARDLESS OF WHO FILES THE SUIT UNLESS WE AGREE
THAT A SUIT MAY BE BROUGHT IN A DIFFERENT STATE.
We will process the Account application, make the decision to open
the Account and advance credit for you from our Utah offices. You
agree that all terms, conditions, and other provisions relating to the
method of determining the balance upon which the interest rate of
FINANCE CHARGES are applied, and other terms of this
Agreement shall be deemed to be material to the determination of
the interest rate.

(R. 182, 199) (original CAPS).
5
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Advanta advanced credit to Abraham from Utah and made cash advances to
Abraham from Utah. (R. 181, 182, 199). Abraham made purchases on the card (R. 18182). In 2005, Abraham received cash advances from Advanta in Utah (R. 181-82, 229,
230, 232, 233, 235). Abraham made payments on the card in Utah and Pennsylvania. (R.
230, 242, 656). Abraham's last payment to Advanta was made on August 17, 2015, in
the amount of $283.00. (R. 182, 229, 253). At that time, Abraham owed the principal
sum of $11,528.59, plus interest. (R. 208, 253).
In 2007, Advanta assigned to Federated Capital its interests in Abraham's account.
(R. 17 8, 181, 2 53).
Federated Capital sought to recover the amount Abraham owed by filing the
Complaint on August 5, 2011, which was within six years of Abraham's default. (R. 1-3,
182). As required by the Agreement's forum selection clause, Federated Capital filed its
claims in Utah. (R. 1-3, 183).
Abraham filed an Answer on February 12, 2012, wherein she admitted that
payments on the credit card had not been made, but raised as her fourth defense: "As an
affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that this action fails because of the statute of
limitations." (R. 102-04). Abraham did not, however, refer to or describe the statute by
section number and subsection designation, as required by Rule 9(i) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
On June 18, 2013, Abraham filed a Motion for Summary Judgment - Statute of
Limitations - and for an Award of Attorney's Fees, and in her Memorandum asserted for
the first time that Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitation for breach of contract
6
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(j)

governed, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5525(a)(8). (R. 129-39). Abraham also asserted for the first
time that under Utah's Borrowing Statute, Utah Code § 78B-2-103

2
,

the cause of action

arose in Pennsylvania, making Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitation applicable
and Federated Capital's claims beyond the statute. (R. 136-37).
The district court granted summary judgment in Abraham's favor. (R. 468-72).
The district court found that statute of limitations are procedural laws, and matters of
procedure are governed by the law of the forum. (R. 470). The district court further
found that Utah's statute of limitations contained within Title 78B, Chapter 2 of the Utah
Code apply to this case. (R. 471). The district court also found that Federated Capital's
<i)

claims arose in another jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, because payments were to be made in
Pennsylvania. (R. 471-72). Because Federated Capital was not a citizen of Utah and did
not hold the cause of action from the time it accrued, the Borrowing Statute applied. (R.
471). The district court also awarded Abraham her attorney's fees under Utah Code §
78B-5-826. (R. 4 72).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Binding Utah Supreme Court precedent uniformly holds that a defendant must
specifically plead the applicable section of the statute of limitations, or such affirmative
defense is waived.

In this case, Abraham failed to specifically plead the applicable

statute of limitations, as required by Utah case law and Rule 9(i) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Abraham waived this affirmative defense and such waiver should have
been obvious to the district court.
2

Abraham actually cited Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-103, which does not exist. (R. 135).
7
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ARGUMENT

I.

ABRAHAM WAIVED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE AND
SUCH WAIVER SHOULD HA VE BEEN OBVIOUS TO THE DISTRICT
COURT
By not specifying the statute of limitations by section and subsection number,

Abraham waived the statute of limitations affirmative defense. Abraham was required to
establish she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, meaning she was required to
establish she properly pleaded the affirmative defense of statute of limitations. Abraham
never established this affirmative defense was properly pleaded, and the district court
plainly erred by granting summary judgment under these circumstances.
An issue not preserved below but raised on appeal is reviewed under the plain
error standard. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,

,r 16,

164 P.3d 366. "Under plain error

review, we may reverse the lower court on an issue not properly preserved for appeal
when a party can show the following: (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the [party], or phrased differently,
our confidence in the verdict is undermined." Id. (citation omitted).

A.

Abraham waived the statute of limitations defense.

In her Answer, filed on February 12, 2012, Abraham stated as follows: "As an
affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that this action fails because of the statute of
limitations." (R. 102-04). Nowhere did Abraham plead what statute of limitations she
was relying upon, and Abraham certainly did not plead Utah Code § 78B-2-103 or 42 Pa.
C.S.A. § 5525(a)(8). (R. 102-04).

8
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Gi

4i)

Rule 9(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not
necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged
generally that the cause of action is barred by the statute, referring to
or describing the statute by section number, subsection designation,
if any. or designating the provision relied on sufficiently to identify
it.
U.R.C.P. 9(i) (emphasis added). Rule 8(c) provides in relevant part: "A party must set
forth affirmatively in a responsive pleading ... statute of limitations .... " U.R.C.P. 8(c).
And Rule 7(a) defines what constitutes "pleadings":
Pleadings. Only these pleadings are allowed:
(a)(l) a complaint;
(a)(2) an answer to a complaint;
(a)(3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim;
(a)(4) an answer to a crossclaim;
(a)(5) a third-party complaint;
(a)(6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and
(a)(7) a reply to an answer if ordered by the court.
U.R.C.P. 7(a)(l )-(7).
The Utah Supreme Court long ago held that Rule 9 requires more than a generally
pleaded statute of limitations defense; the rule requires the statute of limitations to be
pleaded specifically. For example, in Westerfield v. Coop, 311 P.2d 787 (Utah 1957), the
trial court "applied the Utah statute of limitations to certain amounts claimed, to which no
one took timely exception .... " Id. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that because

9
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defense counsel "generally pleaded the statute of limitations, but not in accordance with
3

our rules[,] [s]tatutes of limitation are not pertinent on this appeal." Id.
And in Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970), the Utah
Supreme Court reversed the trial court, allowing plaintiff to recover on an eleven-yearold contract because defendant "pleaded the statute of limitations generally without
designating the section of the statute or statutes upon which he relied." Id. at 1008, 101011. Notably, the Utah Supreme Court observed in a footnote:

It should be further observed that there is no similar federal rule to
Rule 9(h) .... It has been uniformly held as the law of this state that
the applicable section of the statute of limitations must be
specifically pleaded.
Hopkinson, 465 P.2d at 1011, f.n. 5 (citing American Theatre Co. v. Glasmann, 80 P.2d
922 (Utah 1938); Ne/den-Judson Drug Co. v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Ogden, 74 P. 195
(Utah 1903); Spanish Fork City v. Hopper, 26 P. 293 (Utah 1891)).
Likewise, this Court also held, "Statute of Limitations defenses are affirmative
defenses and are waived unless properly raised." Barnard & Burk Grp, Inc. v. Labor

Comm 'n, 2005 UT App 401,

1 6,

122 P.3d 700 (citation omitted).

In Barnard & Burk

Grp, Inc., Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. ("Barnard"), appealed the Labor Commission's
award of medical expenses and disability pay to a former employee. Id. at

1 1.

In its

answer, Barnard stated, "Defendants affirmatively allege the applicant's claims are or
may be barred or limited by the statutes of limitation and/or notice provisions contained

3

Footnote I provides: "Rule 9(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, require pleading of
statutes of limitation by specific description and by section number of the statute."
Westerfield, 311 P.2d at 787.
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(tl

in Utah Code Annotated§ 34A-2 et seq., § 34A-3 et seq., and § 35-1 et seq." Id. at

il 3.

~

Before the Labor Commission, Barnard raised the specific statute of limitations, Utah
Code§ 34A-2-417, for the first time. Id. at iJ 4. The Labor Commission determined that
Barnard failed to timely raise the limitations defense as required by the rule. Id.
On appeal, this Court compared the requirements of Rule 602-2-1 D of the Utah
Administrative Code with Rule 9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and noted that
~

both require that statute of limitations defenses be pleaded with specificity. Id. at il1 6, 10,
f.n. 3. This Court affirmed the Labor Commission, and found that even though not
asserted by the parties, Barnard had waived the statute of limitations defense, which
provided "a separate ground for affirmance apparent on the record." Id. at iJ 13.
These cases demonstrate that a statute of limitations defense is waived if the
specific statute is not properly described in the pleadings.
In 2011, with the numerous amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 9(h) was amended and moved to Rule 9(i), with only slight modifications not
affecting the substance of the rule. Inasmuch as there are no substantive nor material
changes in Rule 9(i), Utah case law still holds that a statute of limitations defense must be
pleaded with specificity or such defense is waived.
Abraham waived her statute of limitations affirmative defense because she failed
to describe the statute by section number in her pleadings.

~

11
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B.

Abraham's waiver of the statute of limitations defense should have
been obvious to the district court.

That Abraham failed to properly plead the statute of limitations defense should
have been obvious to the district court because Abraham never established she properly
raised the affirmative defense of statute of limitations.
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." U.R.C.P. 56(c) (2011). 4

"Summary judgment is

appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W Dev.,
Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). "Because a summary judgment
challenge presents only legal issues, we review the grant of summary judgment for
correctness." Id.
Before the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Abraham,
Abraham was required to establish she had properly pleaded the applicable statute of
limitations. For example, in Pepperwood Homeowners Ass 'n v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App
137,351 P.3d 844, plaintiff brought suit against defendant, alleging that defendant owned
property "subject to a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions" that allowed
plaintiff to levy assessments against defendant for ce11ain expenses related to plaintiffs

4

Federated Capital cites the rule as it existed prior to 2015, which 2015 amendments
"adopt the style of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 without changing the substantive
Utah law." U.R.C.P. 56 advisory committee note.
12
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~

operations. Id. at 1 1. Plaintiff thereafter moved for summary judgment, alleging past due
amounts, and attached an affidavit with a ledger showing the amounts claimed due. Id. at

1 2.

Plaintiff did not, however, attach the certain "declaration of covenants" which

purportedly would entitle plaintiff to recover against defendant. Id. Defendant did not
respond to the motion for summary judgment, and the district court granted plaintifrs
motion citing the lack of response and finding no material issues of disputed fact. Id. at 1
3.

On appeal, this Court first observed the potential "severe consequences" for failing
to oppose a motion for summary judgment, but then observed that "the rules of civil
procedure allow entry of summary judgment against a defaulted party only 'if
appropriate."' Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137,

16

(citing U.R.C.P. 56(e)).

This Court

further observed, "the district court must still determine whether the moving party's
pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law." Id. After citing Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 600, for the standard "the
movant must establish each element of its claim in order to show that he is entitled to
Ci)

judgment as a matter of law", the Court observed, "[b]efore considering whether the
nonmoving party has met its burden to place a factual issue in dispute, the court 'must be
satisfied that the moving party has met its burden of proving that ... [it] is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."' Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137, 18 (citation omitted). "If the
moving party fails to properly support its motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving
party is permitted to rest on the allegations in [its] pleadings." Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
13
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In Mitchell, despite the fact that the defendant did not oppose the motion for
summary judgment, this Court found that the moving party "failed to introduce evidence
sufficient to establish the basis of its claim." Id. at

1

I 0.

Finding that plaintiffs

allegations demonstrate that the "declaration of covenants" formed the basis of plaintiffs
claims against defendant, and finding that defendant denied these allegations in her
answer, this Court found that the plaintiff "needed to establish its claim with admissible
evidence that [defendant] was obligated by virtue of the Declaration to pay the claimed
amounts." Id. at 19. Because the plaintiff failed introduce sufficient evidence to support
its motion for summary judgment, the defendant "was permitted to rest on the [denials] in
[her] pleadings." Id. at 1 IO (citation omitted).
Although this issue in Mitchell was not preserved below, the Court found, "It is
plain on the face of [plaintiffs] motion and supporting memorandum that [plaintiff]
failed to support its claim with evidence that the Declaration obligated [defendant] to pay
the assessments.

It should therefore have been obvious to the district court that, by

failing to produce the instrument that formed the basis of its claim, [plaintiff] failed to
demonstrate its entitlement to a judgment on that claim as a matter of law." Id. at

1 11.

Accordingly, the court found plain error and reversed. Id.
And in Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, 1 P.3d 558, this Court observed, "As
with any affirmative defense, defendants have the burden of proving every element
necessary to establish that the statute of limitations bars [plaintiffs] claim." Id. at
(citation omitted).
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These cases, along with the cases set forth above, provide that in order to prevail
on a statute of limitations defense, the moving party carries the burden to establish by the
"pleadings," "affidavits" or other admissible evidence that he is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law. This means that the moving party must show he is entitled
to the statute of limitations defense and that it was properly pleaded.
This case is similar to Mitchell because it is obvious in Abraham's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
that Abraham did not assert or even attempt to show that she had properly pleaded the
statute of limitations defense. (R. 129-39). Instead, Abraham asserted for the first time in
her Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, that Utah Code§ 78-2103 was the applicable statute of limitations, and that through this Borrowing Statute, the
four-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations applied. (R. 135-37).
Because Abraham failed to show that her statute of limitations defense was
properly pleaded, Abraham failed to prove every element necessary to establish that the
applicable statute of limitations bar's Federal Capital's claims. See Conder, 2000 UT
App 105,

if

14. Like Mitchell, this failure allowed Federated Capital to rest on the

pleadings, which pleadings show that Abraham waived this affirmative defense. See R.
103 (Answer, p. 2).
It should have been obvious to the district court that, by failing to present the

pleading that established the statute of limitations affirmative defense, or by failing to
assert that the statute of limitations had been properly pleaded as required by Rule 9(i),
that Abraham could not prove this essential element of her defense. Abraham's motion
15
~
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simply failed to demonstrate that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the
Gi)

district court plainly erred finding otherwise.

C.

The district court's error is prejudicial.

Absent the district court's error, the result would have been different. Due to
Abraham's waiver of the statute of limitations defense, summary judgment should not
have been granted and Federated Capital should have been allowed to proceed with its
claims.

(ii

Additionally, before filing her Answer, Abraham moved to dismiss the case for
lack of personal jurisdiction (R. 18), which motion was denied. (R. IO I).

Abraham

sought and was awarded attorney fees on that motion, and on the motion for summary
judgment.
If this Court reverses the district court's ruling, Abraham will no longer be the
prevailing party. Accordingly, this Court should also reverse the district court's award of
attorney fees.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
The district court plainly erred by not finding that Abraham waived the statute of
limitations defense and by finding that Abraham was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. This prejudicial error should have been obvious to the district court and Federated
Capital respectfully requests reversal of summary judgment.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION,
dba FEDERATED CAPITAL FINANCIAL
CORPORATION
Plaintiff,

Amended Holding of Undisputed Facts,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment on
Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and
FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST
PLAINTIFF

v.
ARNELLA M. ABRAHAM, individually and
dba WESTSTAR PROPERTIES, INC.

Civil No. 119901843
Judge: Collection

The Court held a hearing on March 14, 2014 on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees. Present at the hearing were Christopher Hill as counsel for
the plaintiff and Lester A. Perry as counsel for the defendant. Having heard the argument of counsel
and having read and considered the pleadings and exhibits filed herein, the Court makes the
following holding of undisputed facts and conclusions of law and enters the following judgment.

I. Holding of Undisputed Facts.
The Court holds that the following material facts are undisputed.
I. Federated Capital Corp. ("Federated") is not a citizen of Utah, but is a Michigan corporation
doing business in Utah.

May 12, 2014 10:09 AM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

00468
1 of 5

2. The defendant is not a resident of Utah, but resides in Texas.
3. Federated filed suit in Utah pursuant to a forum selection clause in the operative contract.
4. Federated alleged in its Complaint that the defendant had a credit card account with
Advanta.
5. Federated alleged that the account was governed by a written contract entitled "Advanta
Business Card Agreement" (the "Agreement"), a copy of which was attached to Federated's
Complaint.
6. Federated alleged that the account was assigned to it by Advanta.
7. The assignment was made to Federated after the account was in default.
8. Federated produced credit card statements sent by Advanta to the defendant each month that
stated that payments on the account should be sent to Advanta Bank Corp. at an address in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
9. The Agreement states at if 6.
"You agree to make all payments in US dollars payable through a US Financial
Institution, either by check or money order payable to us at the
location and in the manner specified on your periodic billing
statement or in any other manner (such as by electronic fund transfer
or wire transfer) that we agree to and provide procedures for."
In the next to the last paragraph of if 6, the Agreement also states:
HAccount payments are to be mailed to the address for payments shown on your
periodic billing statement. Payment must be received by us at that address on or
before the specified time on the Payment Due Date stated on your periodic billing
statement, and must conform to any specific requirements for making payment which

QI)

May 12, 2014 10:09 AM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00469
2 of 5

appear with or in your billing statement. Payments tendered to and accepted by us or
our agent at a location other than the address stated on your periodic billing statement
are not effective until received by us at the address specified."
[Emphasis added.]
1. The account was in default prior to March, 2006 and the last payment was made on the
account prior to March, 2006.
2. This case was filed on August 9, 2011 and service of the Summons and Complaint was
thereafter made on the defendant.
3. The Agreement contains an attorney fee provision allowing Advanta and its assignee,
Federated, to collect its costs of collection, including attorney's fees and court costs, in this
lawsuit. See CJ{ 5 of the Agreement. Federated prayed for an award of its costs of collection
including attorney's fees in its Complaint.

I. The defendant incurred attorney's fees, expenses and court costs in defense of this lawsuit
which have been set forth in an accompanying Declaration of defendant's counsel.
II. Conclusions of Law.
The Court makes the following conclusions of law.
~

1. Statutes of limitations are procedural laws. Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 870 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1994), citing Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993). Matters of procedure are
governed by the law of the forum, i.e. the law of the state in which the lawsuit is brought.
Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm of Broward County, Florida, 37 P.3d 1093, ,I 14

May 12, 2014 10:09 AM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gj

00470
3 of 5

(Utah 2001), citing Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681,684 n.3 (Utah 1981). As a general rule,
Utah's statutes of limitations apply to actions brought in Utah. Financial Bancorp, Inc. v.
Pingree and Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 17 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994).
2. Utah's statutes of limitations contained within Title 78B, Chapter 2 of the Utah Code apply
~

to this case.
3. These statutes include the Utah borrowing statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-103. This statute
provides:

A cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not actionable in
the other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time, may not be pursued in this state,
unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state who has held the cause of

<t

action from the time it accrued.

I. The exception in the last phrase of the borrowing statute does not apply to the plaintiff. The
cause of action was not held by a citizen of Utah and Federated received the account after it
was in default and after the cause of action had already accrued.
2. A cause of action for breach of contract arises in the state in which the parties determine that
performance was due. Brown v. Bach, 53 P. 991 (Utah 1898). See also, Lawson v. Tripp, 95
P. 520 (Utah 1908) and Financial Bancorp, Inc. v. Pingree and Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 17
Ut. App. 1994 ).
3. The Agreement provides that the defendant was to perform the contract by making payment
to Advanta.
~

4. Payment was to be made to the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania address indicated on the Advanta
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monthly statements. See ,r 6 of the Agreement. Payment was not effective until Advanta
received it at that address. Id.
5. Pennsylvania has a four year statute of limitations for breach of contract. 42 Pa. C.S.A.
§5525(a)(8).
6. Breach of the Agreement occurred well before March 2006, when the account was written
off by Advanta. This suit was not filed until August 9, 2011, a date well past the four year
limitations period under Pennsylvania law.
7. This case was barred from being filed by the statute of limitations.
8. The defendant prevailed in this lawsuit and is entitled to an award of the attorney's fees,
expenses and court costs incurred in this action under Utah's reciprocal attorney's fee
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826.
III. Judgment.
Having made its holding of undisputed facts and conclusions of law, the Court dismisses this case
with prejudice and enters judgment on behalf of the defendant and against Federated for $15,320.00.
This is the final judgment in the matter.
END OF ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters.

(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an
organized association of persons that is made a party. A party may raise an issue as to the
legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of
a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity by specific negative averment, which
shall include facts within the pleader's knowledge. If raised as an issue, the party relying on
such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the trial.
(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the name of an
adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party
may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true
name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended
accordingly.
(a)(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an action to quiet
title wherein any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings
may describe such unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title,
estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the
complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto."
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed
or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with
particularity, and when so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on
the trial establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence.
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver
that the document was issued or the act done in compliance with law.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial
or quasi judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or
decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction
shall be made specifically and with particularity and when so made the party pleading the
judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts.

(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of
time and place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material
matter.
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be
specifically stated.
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state
the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is
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barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to. or· describing such statute
specifically and definitely by section number, subsection designation, if any,· ·or otherwise
designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is
controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing
that the cause of action is so. barred.

~

(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance
of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is
sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its
section number or other designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances.
The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof.

U) Libel and slander.
0)(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to
set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter
out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was
published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party
alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or
spoken.
0)(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may
allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances
to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may
give in evidence the mitigating circumstances.

~

(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the
judgment with particularity or attach a copy of the judgment to the complaint.
(I) Allocation of fault.

(1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78B, Chapter 5, Part 8
shall file:
(1)(1 )(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated; and
(1)(1 )(B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-party,
including name, address, telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party is
unknown, the party shall so state.
(1)(2) The information specified in subsection (1)(1) must be included in the party's
responsive pleading if then known or must be included in a supplemental notice filed within a
reasonable time after the party discovers the factual and legal basis on which fault can be
allocated but no later than the deadline specified in the discovery plan under Rule 26(f). The
court, upon motion and for good cause shown, may permit a party to file the information
specified in subsection (1)(1) after the expiration of any period permitted by this rule, but in
no event later than 90 days before trial.
(1)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this
rule.

C,
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters.
(a) Capacity or Authority to Sue; Legal Existence.

(1) In General. Except when required to show that the court has jurisdiction, a pleading need not allege:
(A) a party's capacity to sue or be sued;

(8) a party's authority to sue or be sued in a representative capacity; or
(C) the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party.

(2) Raising Those Issues. To raise any of those issues, a party must do so by a specific denial, which must

state any supporting facts that are peculiarly within the party's knowledge.
(b) Unknown parties.
(b)(1) Designation. When a party does not know the name of an opposing party, it may state that fact in

the pleadings, and designate the opposing party in a pleading by any name. When the true name of the
opposing party becomes known, the pleading must be amended.
(b)(2) Descriptions of interest in quiet title actions. If one or more parties in an action to quiet title are

designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe the unknown persons as "all other
persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the
pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding its title."
(c) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of
a person's mind may be alleged generally.
(d) Conditions precedent. In pleading conditions precedent, it is sufficient to allege generally that all

conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. When denying that a condition precedent has
been performed or has occurred, a party must do so with particularity.
(e) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or official act it is sufficient to allege that the

document was legally issued or the act was legally done.
(f) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, a judicial or quasi-judicial

tribunal, or a board or officer, it is sufficient to plead the judgment or decision without showing jurisdiction to
render it.
(g) Time and place. An allegation of time or place is material when testing the sufficiency of a pleading.
(h) Special damage. If an item of special damage is claimed, it must be specifically stated.

(i) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts showing
the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by the statute, referring to or
describing the statute by section number, subsection designation, if any, or designating the provision relied on
sufficiently to identify it.

(j) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute, an ordinance, or a right derived from a
statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to the statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or
by its section number or other designation in any official publication of the statute or ordinance. The court will
take judicial notice of the statute or ordinance.

(k) Libel and slander.
(k}(1) Pleading defamatory matter. In an action for libel or slander it is sufficient to allege generally

that the defamatory matter out of which the action arose was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If
the allegation is denied, the party alleging the defamatory matter must establish at trial that it was
published or spoken.
(k)(2) Pleading defense. The defendant may allege the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and

any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages. Whether or not justification is proved, the
defendant may give evidence of the mitigating circumstances.
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(I) Allocation of fault.
(1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78B, Chapter 5 1 Part 8 must file:
(1)(1 )(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated; and
(1)(1 )(B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-party, including
name, address, telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party is unknown, the party
must so state.
(1)(2) The information specified in paragraph (1)(1) must be included in the party's responsive pleading
if then known or must be included in a supplemental notice filed within a reasonable time after the party
discovers the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated. The court, upon motion and for good
cause shown, may permit a party to file the information specified in paragraph (1)(1) after the expiration of
any period permitted by this rule, but in no event later than 90 days before trial.
(1)(3) A party must not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this rule.
Advisory Committee Notes
Effective as of November 1, 2016.
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Utah Code

788-2-103 Action barred in another state barred in Utah.
A cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not actionable in the other
jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time, may not be pursued in this state, unless the cause of
action is held by a citizen of this state who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session

i)
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Utah Code

788-2-309 Within six years -- Mesne profits of real property -- Instrument in writing.
An action may be brought within six years:
( 1) for the mesne profits of real property;
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except those
mentioned in Section 788-2-311 ; and
(3) to recover fire suppression costs or other damages caused by wildland fire.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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